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The Accountability of Government Networks
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER*
Administrative agencies are networking with their counterparts
worldwide.' These "government networks," or, more generally,
"transgovernmental regulatory networks," are attracting increasing attention
and concern.2 For some, they herald a new and attractive form of global
governance, enhancing the ability of States to work together to address
common problems without the centralized bureaucracy of formal international
institutions They are fast, flexible, and decentralized-attributes that allow
them to function particularly well in a rapidly changing information
environment. For others, however, these networks portend a vast technocratic
conspiracy-a shadowy world of regulators bent on "de-politicizing" global
* J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of International, Foreign, and Comparative Law, Harvard Law
School.
i. See. e.g., Scott H. Jacobs, Regulatory Co-operation for an Interdependent World: Issues for
Government, in REGULATORY CO-OPERATION FOR AN rNTERDEPENDENT WORLD 15-38 (Org. For Econ. Co-
operation & Dev., 1994); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government
Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL PoLmcS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 177 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Governing the Global
Economy]; Sol Picciotto, Fragmented States and International Rules of Law, 6 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 259
(1997) [hereinafter Picciotto, Fragmented States]; Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic
Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas ofNeo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. L. & Bus. 1014 (1996-97)
[hereinafter Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real
New World Order, 76 FOREIGN Are. 183 (1997) [hereinafter Slaughter, Real New World Order]; THOMAS
RISSE-KAPPEN, COOPERATION AMONG DEMOcRAciEs 38 (1995) (defining "transgovernmental coalitions"
as "transboundary networks among subunits of national governments forming in the absence of central and
authoritative national decisions"). Risse-Kappen further defines "transgovemnmental networks" as those
among state officials in sub-units of national governments, international organizations, and regimes
frequently pursuing their own agenda, independently from and sometimes contrary to the declared policies
of their national governments. Id. at 38-40. Finally, he insists that in a genuine transgovemmental regime,
"[s]ub-units of national governments have to act on their own, in the absence of national decisions, not just
on behalf of their heads of state implementing agreed-upon policies." Id. at 9. When this occurs,
"ft]ransgovernmental coalitions are then defined as networks of government officials which include at least
one actor pursuing her own agenda independent of national decisions." Id.
2. Various authors have various names for these networks; in my terminology they are a subset of
the larger and growing phenomenon of "government networks:" networks of different types of government
institutions from courts to legislatures. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L
L 1103 (2000). See also Slaughter, Real New World Order. supra note 1, at 184.
3. See Slaughter, Real New World Order, supra note 1, at 186, 195. See also Slaughter, Governing
the Global Economy, supra note 1, at 177-8 1. 1 continue to argue the merits of this form of governance;
however, I am increasingly aware of the actual and potential problems associated with these networks.
Hence the importance of focusing on accountability.
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issues in ways that will inevitably benefit the rich and powerful at the expense
of the poor and weak.'
These competing perspectives come to a head on the issue of
accountability. While both corporations and civic institutions such as
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are networking to attain genuine
global reach, networks of government agencies involve public officials and at
least some exercise of the governmeintal power granted to them. Determining
how to hold these officials democratically accountable becomes a paramount
concern.
Consider the following critiques. Philip Alston argues that the formation
of these networks "suggests a move away from arenas of relative transparency
into the back rooms," and hence "the bypassing of the national political arenas
to which the United States and other proponents of the importance of healthy
democratic institutions attach so much importance."' Antonio Perez similarly
worries about an open "move toward technocratic elitism."6 Sol Picciotto
diagnoses the problem as a "chronic lack of legitimacy," stemming from the
informality and confidentiality of transgovemmental contacts. As he notes,
these are "precisely the attributes that make them so attractive to the
participants."7 Finally, from Stephen Toope: "Networks, like regimes, and
regardless of their membership, are sites of power, and potentially of exclusion
and inequality. . . . Indeed, as typically subterranean creatures, operating
outside the realm of public scrutiny, governance networks may be even less
accountable than some States."
The immediate and conventional response to these accountability concerns
is to "increase transparency" by making decisions and documents widely
4. See, e.g. Picciotto, Fragmented States, supra note 1, at 273 (dispersal of politics into functional
arenas "appears to allow particular issues to be regulated in a depoliticized, technocratic maner, by managers
or professionals who are directly accountable to their 'customers"'); see also Picciotto, Networks in
International Economic Integration, supra note 1, at 1037.
5. Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 8 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 435,441 (1997).
6. Antonio F. Perez, Who Killed Sovereignty? Or: Changing Norms Concerning Sovereignty In
International Law, 14 WIs. INT'L L. J. 463, 476 (1996) (book review). Perez is not addressing
transgovernmental regulatory networks per se, but rather a related argument about networks among national
and international bureaucrats advanced by Abram and Antonia Chayes. See generally ABRAM CHAYES &
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995).
7. Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration, supra note 1, at 1047.
8. Stephen J. Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law, in THE ROLE OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 91, 96-97.
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available to interested groups. But, as Joseph Weiler notes, within the
European Union (EU):
It is time to worry about infranationalism-a complex
network of middle-level national administrators, [European]
Community administrators and an array of private bodies
with unequal and unfair access to a process with huge social
and economic consequences to everyday life-in matters of
public safety, health, and all other dimensions of socio-
economic regulation. Transparency and access to documents
are often invoked as a possible remedy to this issue. But if
you do not know what is going on, which documents will you
ask to see?9
To think seriously about the question of accountability requires a more
systematic and careful analysis of both the different types of accountability
and the different types of government networks. This Article distinguishes
between national and global accountability and among government networks
that operate in existing international organizations, within the framework of
a treaty, and outside any preexisting formal framework. By attempting to
build a conceptual framework, this Article seeks to contextualize specific
problems for the ultimate purpose of creating, developing, or adapting
accountability mechanisms. But it will inevitably beg as many questions as it
answers.
To begin with, this rudimentary framework relies on an essentially
commonsense understanding of "accountability," meaning that those who
exercise power on behalf of others can be held accountable if that power is
misused or abused. U.S. administrative law, and indeed comparative
administrative law, has spent decades grappling with the definition and
conceptualization of accountability, as well as with a host of different
mechanisms designed to enhance agency accountability, legitimacy, and
responsiveness without sacrificing effectiveness. But here administrative law
intersects international law and forces international lawyers to look within the
State, while international law intersects administrative law and poses questions
of global equity. This Article offers an overview of those twin points of
9. Joseph Weiler, To Be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilization, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
EUROPE: "DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
324, 349 (Joseph Weiler ed., 1999).
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intersection and suggests a possible starting point for considering and
addressing the various problems clumped under the umbrella of
"accountability."
I. A SHORT AND SELECTIVE HISTORY OF TRANSGOVERNMENTALISM
Analysts have spent more time identifying and labeling government
networks than distinguishing between them. Government networks are
typically identified as part of the larger phenomenon of "transnationalism."
Philip Jessup introduced international lawyers to "transnational law" in 1958,
defining it as "all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national
frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other
rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories."'0 Henry Steiner
and Detlev Vagts later translated this concept into a casebook, collecting
materials designed to bridge the gap between the domestic and international
legal worlds."
Political scientists embraced transnational relations somewhat later, in the
late 1960s and 1970s. They acknowledged the plethora of nontraditional actors
in the international system and tried to relate them to both States and
international organizations. The theoretical debate initially focused on whether
to define transnationalism in terms of the identity of the actors or the nature of
the activity. In the influential edited volume Transnational Relaions and
World Politics, Keohane and Nye defined transnational relations as "contacts,
coalitions, and interactions across [S]tate boundaries that are not controlled by
the central foreign policy organs of government."'" Samuel Huntington
responded to this idea by arguing that the definition of transnational relations
should focus not on the actors involved in the process, but rather on the
10. PHiupC. .JESSUP,TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2(1956). In footnote 3 of the first chapter, Jessup cites
Joseph Johnson as one of the originators of the term in an address of June 15, 1955 to the Harvard
Foundation. Id. at n.3.
1I. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS xv-xvi (Henry J. Steiner & Detlev F. Vagts, eds., 2d ed. 1976).
Steiner and Vagts built on Jessup's broad definition and focused on topics including aspects of national legal
systems dealing with principles and procedures for decision-making that have been specifically developed
to regulate problems with some foreign element. The relevant participants in transnational activity include
"private individuals or firms, national courts or legislators or treaty-makers, governmental instrumentalities,
international officials, or regional and international organizations." Id. at xvii.
12. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLrnCS xi (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Robert O. Keohane.
eds.. 1972) (hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS]. They identify a separate subset of "transnational
interactions" as "the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one
actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organization." Id. at xii.
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activity itself. He viewed transnationalism as a peculiarly "American mode of
expansion," based on "freedom to operate" rather than "power to control.""
Several years later, Keohane and Nye explicitly distinguished
"transgovernmental" activity from the broader category of transnational
activity, defining "transgovernmental relations" as "sets of direct interactions
among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely
guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those
governments."' They quoted Francis Bator for the proposition that "it is a
central fact of foreign relations that business is carried on by the separate
departments with their counterpart bureaucracies abroad, through a variety of
informal as well as formal connections."'" Their principal interest in this article
was to identify the various ways in which the existence of transgovernmental
politics, as well as transnational politics, offered ways for international
organizations to play an important role in world politics. 6 Nevertheless, they
identified different types of transgovernmental activity (policy coordination
and coalition-building), enumerated the conditions under which
transgovernmental networks are most likely to form, and specified different
types of interactions between international organizations and
transgovernmental networks.
Prominent international relations theorists largely lost interest in
transnational and transgovernmental relations during the 1980s and early
1990s when interest focused primarily on security studies and interstate
"regimes." Over the course of the 1990s, however, several events cast a
spotlight on a new generation of transgovernmental networks. As the bipolar
State system of the Cold War disappeared and nonstate, substate, and
supranational actors rode the tide of globalization, many pundits and scholars
13. Samuel Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World Politics, 25 WORLD POL. 333, 344
(1973).
14. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Transgovernmental Relations and International
Organizations, 27 WORLD POLrTCS 39, 43 (1974) [hereinafter Transgovernmental Relations]. They
included in their definition the increased communication between governmental agencies and business
carried on by separate departments with their counterpart bureaucracies abroad. Id. at 41-42. By contrast,
a meeting of heads-of-state at which new initiatives are taken was still the paradigm of the state-centric
(interstate) model. Id. at 43-44. Compare their earlier depiction of traditional "interstate" relations, in which
"actors are behaving in conformity to roles specified or reasonably implied by the formal foreign policy
structure of the state." TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 12, at 383.
15. Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 14, at 42 (quoting US. Foreign Economic Policy:
Implications for the Organization of the Executive Branch: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Foreign
Economic Policy of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong. 110-1 1 (July 25, 1972) (testimony of
Francis M. Bator, Professor of Political Economy, Harvard University)).
16. Id.
352 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 8:347
began heralding the era of complex, multilevel global governance, tied
together by networks.' 7 Early on, Peter Haas explored the role and power of
"epistemic communities," loose groups of policymakers, NGOs, scientists, and
other actors driven by an interest in a particular issue area, such as climate
change or human rights.' Later work absorbed the insights gained about the
power of shared learning and knowledge production generated by the
epistemic communities literature, but concentrated on more concrete and
observable organizational forms.
Several convergent factors focused growing attention on the more specific
phenomenon of transgovernmental regulatory networks. First were the
observable changes in the organization and activities of national financial
regulators. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basle
Committee) was created in 1974 and now comprises the representatives of
twelve central banks that regulate the world's largest banking markets.' 9
Between 1975 and 1992, it issued the Basle Concordat with several sets of
subsequent amendments, to enhance cooperation between regulators of
multinational banks by dividing specified tasks between home country and
host country regulators. In 1988, the Basle Committee issued a set of capital
adequacy standards to be adopted by its members as the new regulatory
standard within their countries. These standards had a sharp impact on the
availability of credit in the world's most important economies.20 The
17. See generally THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999); GOVERNANCE
WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto
Czempieleds., 1992);JAMES ROSENAU, ALONGTHEDoMESTic-FOREIGN FRONTIER (1997). For an excellent
review of much of the governance literature, see Gerry Stoker, Governance as Theory: Five Propositions,
50 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 17 (1998). For an influential discussion of multi-level governance within the EU, see
Fritz W. Scharpf, Community Policy and Autonomy: Multilevel Policymaking in European Union (EUI
Working Paper RSC No. 94/1, 1994).
18. See. e.g., PETER M. HAAS, INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH (1993); PETER M. HAAS, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1991); PETER M. HAAS, KNOwLEDGE, POWER, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY
COORDINATION (1997); PETER M. HAAS, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (1990).
19. The Basle Committee is now known as the International Monetary and Financial Committee (as
of 30 September 1999); its members are the Governors for Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, China, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. See International Monetary Fund (IMF), A Brief Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs:
A Factsheet, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/groups.htn#IC (last visited May 15,
2001) (hereinafter IMF Factsheet].
20. TONY PORTER, STATES, MARKETS AND REGIMES IN GLOBAL FINANCE 3 (1993). See also David
Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory
Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L L J. 281,284 (1998) (describing charge by SEC chair Breeden that the Basle
Committee agreement had contributed greatly to world recession).
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International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) emerged in
1984, followed in the 1990s by the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors and later by the Financial Stability Forum, a network of all three
of these organizations and other national and international officials responsible
for financial stability around the world.2 As several scholars point out, these
"organizations" do not fit the model of an organization held either by
international lawyers or political scientists-they are not composed of States
and constituted by treaty, they do not enjoy legal personality, and they have
neither headquarters nor even stationery.' According to Sol Picciotto,
however, they do "form part of a more general shift from 'government' to
'governance,' involving the delegation or transfer of public functions to
particularized bodies, operating on the basis of professional or scientific
techniques."
A second major impetus for the study of transgovemmental networks has
been the emergence of a new "multilayered regulatory system" concentrated
among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries.2" These governments have responded to deepening economic and
financial integration and increasing interdependence across a wide range of
issues by developing strategies for regulatory cooperation and rapprochement.
Transgovernmental networks have proliferated in response to these needs.
However, as an OECD study concluded in 1994, the new forms of governance
necessary to make regulatory cooperation work cannot simply follow function.
They must instead be managed within a principled framework designed not
21. See IMF Factsheet, supra note 19.
The Financial Stability Forum was initiated by the Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors of the Group of Seven industrial countries in February 1999,
following a report on international cooperation and coordination in the area of
financial market supervision and surveillance by the President of the Deutsche
Bundesbank. In addition to representatives from the Basle Committee, JOSCO, and
IAIS, its members include "senior representatives from national authorities
responsible for financial stability in significant international financial centers;"
international financial institutions such as the BIS, the IMF, the OECD, and the
World Bank; and "committees of central bank experts."
Id. For a discussion of additional networks created by the Basic Committee, IOSCO, and the IAIS, such as
the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates and the Year 2000 Network, see Slaughter. Governing the
Global Economy. supra note 1, at 186-88.
22. Zaring, supra note 20, at 285 (pointing out that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations does
not include these types of organization); see also Porter, supra note 20, at 4-5.
23. Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration, supra note 1, at 1039.
24. Jacobs, supra note I, at 17.
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only to improve their effectiveness and the quality of their output, but also to
"protect democratic processes."2"
Third, the most concentrated site for multilevel governance, and
particularly transgovermnental regulatory interactions, is the EU itself.
Following the completion of the single market in 1992, the EU has emerged
as a "regulatory state," exercising power through rulemaking rather than taxing
and spending.26 Responding to the challenge of harmonizing or at least
reconciling the regulations of its diverse and growing members, the EU has
developed a system of "regulation by networks," located in the Council of
Ministers (Council) and the complex process of "comitology" that surrounds
Council decisionmaking 7 The question now confronting legal scholars and
political theorists is how decisionmaking by networks of national regulators
fits with varying national models of democracy.'
Fourth is the emergence of a system of "transatlantic governance" to help
foster and manage the increasingly dense web of transatlantic economic
cooperation.2' Although transatlantic regulatory relations may seem to be only
a subset of the larger multilayered regulatory system just discussed, they take
place within the framework of several specific initiatives launched by heads
of state. As described by Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer, transatlantic
governance involves cooperation at the intergovernmental level, the
transgovermnental level, and the transnational level." The evolution of
transatlantic relations during the 1990s has thus spawned questions concerning
the interrelationship and relative importance of these three levels.3
Finally, transgovernmental networks play an important role in several
recent and still actively debated theories of compliance with international
rules. Abram and Antonia Chayes and Harold Koh have emphasized the
importance of regular interaction, dialogue, and "jawboning" among networks
25. Id. at 35-36.
26. Giandomenico Majone, The European Community as a Regulatory State, 5 COLLECTED COURSES
OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAw 321, 340 (1994).
27. Renaud Dehousse, Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of European
Agencies, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 246,254 (1997).
28. Several recent articles exploring this question include Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-
Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EURo. L J. 313 (1997); Christian Joerges & Juergen Neyer, From
intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutional Comitology, 3 EURO.
L.J. 273 (1997); see also the articles collected in EUROPEAN COMm!rrrms: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND
PoLmCs (Christian Joerges & Ellen Vos, eds., 1999).
29. See TRANSATLANIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C.
Shaffer eds., 2001 ).
30. Id.,atch. 1.
31. Id. These are the questions animating the case studies collected in this volume.
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of government officials at both the international and transnational levels.32
Both theories penetrate the traditional black box of the State to focus on the
activities of specific government institutions and officials.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF TRANSGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS
Building on this earlier work and current empirical observation, it is
possible to identify three different types of transgovernmental regulatory
networks based on the different contexts in which they arise and operate. First
are those networks of national regulators that develop within the context of
established international organizations. Second are networks of national
regulators that develop under the umbrella of an overall agreement negotiated
by heads of state. And third are the networks that have attracted the most
attention over the past decade-networks of national regulators that develop
outside any formal framework. These networks arise spontaneously from a
need to work together to address common problems; in some cases, members
interact autonomously enough to require the institutionalization of their
activities in their own transgovernmental regulatory organizations.33
These three types are interlinked in many ways; some may seem such a
standard part of the international furniture as to be beneath notice, while others
compete directly with actual or possible international organizations. For
present purposes, however, each raises different accountability problems. It
is therefore valuable to develop a typology as a first step toward pinpointing
precisely what "lack of accountability" means in this context and what specific
steps might be taken to address it.
A. Government Networks Within International Organizations
What's new? National government officials have always networked
within international organizations; once the heads of state have gone home, the
task of actually getting on with the mission of a particular institution, however
fragile and sketchy, falls to the national government officials in the issue area
concerned. Indeed, depending on the issue area, national officials often play
a role even before the creation of the institution-U.S. Treasury Secretary
32. See CHAYEs&CHAYES, supra note 6; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB.
L REv. 181,181-207 (1996).
33. Zaring refers to these as "international financial regulatory organizations." Zaring, supra note 20,
at 285.
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Harry Dexter White, for example, was certainly present at Bretton Woods.3
But once an institution has been established-whether to regulate international
labor, environmental protection, health, international criminal activity, or the
sprawling and increasingly untidy global markets-it will certainly fall to the
national ministries or agencies charged with the particular issue area in
question to work with the nascent international secretariat officially charged
to represent the organization's interests.
Keohane and Nye describe networks of government ministers within
international organizations as embodying the "club model" of international
institutions.35 Within a particular intergovernmental institution established by
treaty, "cabinet ministers or the equivalent, working in the same issue-area,
initially from a relatively small number of relatively rich countries, got
together to make rules. Trade ministers dominated the GATT; finance
ministers ran the IMF; defense and foreign ministers met at NATO; central
bankers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)." This mode of
operation was efficient for participating governments because the relatively
small and like-minded number of ministers involved formed a negotiating
"club" in which they reached agreements and then reported them to national
legislatures and publics.37
The OECD is perhaps the quintessential example of a transgovernmental
regulatory network within an established international institution. Its primary
function, at least in recent decades, has been to convene government officials
in specific issue areas for the purpose of addressing a common problem and
making a recommendation or promulgating a model code for its solution.38 As
discussed above, the EU Council of Ministers operates the same way, although
Council members exercise actual decision-making power. Finally, in some
cases, the secretariat of an international institution deliberately encourages the
formation of a network of officials from specific governments to act as a
34. RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE: THE ORIGINS
AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1969).
35. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, Paper Prepared for the American Political Science Convention,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 3 1-Sept. 3, 2000, available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/trade/keohane.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Keohane & Nye, Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation].
36. Id. at "The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation."
37. Id.
38. For an excellent brief overview of the OECD's origins and current activities, see James Salzman,
Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 769, 776-83 (2000). The OECD website is also a rich
source of information. See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, What
is OECD?, at http://www.oecd.orgabouttgeneral/index.htm. (last visited Mar. 28, 2001).
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negotiating vanguard in developing new rules that are ultimately designed to
apply to all members.39
B. Government Networks Within the Framework of an Executive Agreement
The second type of transgovernmental network is a more striking form of
governance in that it emerges outside a formal international institution.
Nevertheless, the members of these networks operate within a framework
agreed on at least by the heads of their respective governments.
Transatlantic, transgovernmental interactions specifically authorized and
encouraged by executive agreement are a good recent example. Pollack and
Shaffer chronicle a series of executive agreements between the U.S. President
and the President of the EU Commission to foster increased cooperation,
including the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990, the New Transatlantic Agenda
of 1995 (with a Joint U.S.-EU Action Plan attached), and the Transatlantic
Economic Partnership agreement of 1998.' Each of these agreements spurred
"ad hoc meetings between lower-level officials," as well as among business
enterprises, environmental, and consumer activist groups "on issues of
common concern." These meetings, in turn, have become "a potential catalyst
for transatlantic policy convergence."' Many of these networks of lower level
officials were emerging anyway, for functional reasons, but they undoubtedly
received a boost from agreements at the top.
Another example is the web of transgovernmental networks among
financial officials that has emerged as the pragmatic answer to calls for "a new
financial architecture for the 21st century" in the wake of the Russian and East
Asian financial crises of 1997 and 1998.42 Notwithstanding a wide range of
proposals from academics and policymakers, including one for a global central
bank,43 what actually emerged was a set of financial reform proposals from the
39. See TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, SUpra note 12, at 54 (describing the ways in which international
organizations "facilitate face-to-face meetings among officials in 'domestic' agencies of different
governments; suggesting that 'strategically minded secretariats' of international organizations could plan
meetings with an eye to encouraging such contacts; and identifying several networks involving both
transgovernmental and transnational contacts specifically created by international organizations.").
40. POU.ACK & ScHAFFER, supra note 29, 14-17.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Speech by President Clinton to the Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. 14, 1998 available at
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHiI/2807/mailspeech.htmnl (last visited May 8, 2001). Clinton was
echoing calls by British Prime Minister Tony Blair to build a "new Bretton Woods for the next millennium."
Global Finance. Don't Wait Up, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, U.S. edition, at 83.
43. Jeffrey N. Garten, Needed: A Fed for the World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998. Two British
economists, John Eatwell and Lance Taylor, proposed a World Financial Authority. Don 't Wait Up, supra
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G-22 that were subsequently endorsed by the G-7 (now the G-8)." Largely to
counter the Eurocentric bias of the G-7, the Basle Committee, and the IMF's
"interim committee," which is itself a group of finance ministers, the United
States pushed for the formation of the G-22 in 1997 to create a
transgovemmental network of officials from both developed and developing
countries.45 The East Asian countries most affected were happy to leave the
details of financial reform to the G-22, in lieu of any grander vision.' A
number of the more sweeping reform proposals suggested the formation of still
other networks-a G-16 or a G-15. 47
The actual work done within these networks-policy recommendations,
new sets of standards, and model codes-is done by finance ministers,
securities regulators, central bankers, and other officials responsible for
overseeing national economic policy. But, again, they are convened and
approved by heads of state, often simply through informal agreements or joint
communiqu6s. In fact, when the G-7 issued a statement on global economic
reform in October 1998, the statement itself was issued by finance ministers
and central bank governors, accompanied by a parallel statement from heads
of government.8
C Spontaneous Government Networks-Agencies on the Loose?
In 1974, Keohane and Nye wondered "whether the common interests of
central bankers in a stable currency system have been implemented as fully by
transgovernmental contacts as they might have been." 9 In 2001, the complaint
note 42.
44. Robert Chote, Economics Notebook-" A World in the Woods, FiN. TIMES (London), Nov. 2,1998,
at 20.
45. Don 't Wait Up, supra note 42, at 82-83. In November 1997, President Clinton and other leaders
of the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) announced the temporary creation of the Group of 22 to
advance global financial reform. See IMF Factsheet, supra note 19. Its original members included finance
ministers and central bank governors from the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) and 15 countries with growing markets (Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South
Africa, and Thailand). Id. It subsequently evolved into the G-33 and then the G-20. Id.
46. APEC's Family Feud, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21-27, 1998 at 41.
47. Jeffrey Sachs proposed the creation ofa G-16, composed of the G-8 plus "eight counterparts from
the developing world." The group would "not seek to dictate to the world, but to establish the parameters
for a renewed and honest dialogue." Jeffrey Sachs, Making It Work, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1998, at 23.
Jeffrey Garten proposed a G-l 5 (the G-8 plus 7) to monitor the actions of a new global central bank. Garten,
supra note 43.
48. Chote, supra note 44.
49. Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 14, at 51.
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is the opposite. The transgovernmental regulatory networks that have spurred
the greatest concern are those that have emerged outside formal
intergovernmental agreements, whether treaties or executive agreements. The
Basle Committee is the leading suspect. The image of national regulators
coming together of their own volition and regularizing their interactions as
either a network or a networked organization raises the specter of agencies on
the loose.
These spontaneous networks themselves divide into two further categories.
The first category consists of the networks that institutionalize themselves as
transgovermmental regulatory organizations. The founding and designated
members of these organizations are domestic agencies, or even subnational
agencies such as provincial or State regulators. These organizations tend to
operate with a minimal physical and legal infrastructure. Most lack a
foundational treaty and operate under only a few agreed upon objectives or
bylaws. Nothing they do purports to be legally binding on the members, and
they typically have few or no mechanisms for formal enforcement or
implementation. Rather, these functions are left to the members themselves.5
The second category comprises agreements between the domestic
regulatory agencies of two or more nations. The last few decades have
witnessed the emergence of a vast network of such agreements, effectively
institutionalizing channels of regulatory cooperation between specific
countries. These agreements embrace principles that can be implemented by
the regulators themselves; they do not need further approval by national
legislators. The widespread use of memoranda of understanding and even less
formal initiatives has sped the growth of transgovernmental interaction
exponentially, in contrast to the lethargic pace at which traditional treaty
negotiations proceed. Furthermore, while these agreements are most
commonly bilateral arrangements, they may also evolve into multilateral
arrangements, offering greater scope but less formality than traditional
transgovemmental organizations.
50. Zaring, supra note 20, at 287.
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I. PINPOINTING ACCOUNTABILITY CONCERNS
Transgovernmental interactions within each of these three categories raise
distinct, if often interrelated, accountability concerns. Accountability itself is
such a complex concept, with many different definitions in different contexts
and according to different political theories, that it makes little sense to address
it apart from specific factual situations. It can stand for democracy,
legitimacy, control, responsiveness, and many other attributes of an ideal
government or governance structure.
Nevertheless, the umbrella of accountability captures a core point.
Keohane and Nye put it sharply: "Even in democratic societies, the borderline
between legitimate transgovernmental behavior and treason may be unclear."5
This section identifies specific accountability concerns within each category.
It focuses on responses to these concerns primarily in the third category of
transgovernmental networks outside the framework of a treaty or an executive
agreement.
A. The Accountability of Transgovernmental Interaction within
International Organizations
The traditional working assumption about international organizations is
that if they are duly established by treaty, with the attendant national
ratification procedures, then they exercise only delegated powers from the
Member States and therefore do not raise any formal accountability concerns.
That is not to say that they do not arouse suspicion-often intense
suspicion-among certain domestic constituencies in Member States. Within
the United States, for instance, the United Nations (UN) has been accused of
using a fleet of "black helicopters" to threaten loyal U.S. citizens.52 But both
the executives and the legislatures of participating States have had to approve
the organization's activities and could at least theoretically withdraw their
approval by restricting funding, or even withdrawing from the treaty.
In practice, of course, as Keohane and Nye again pointed out in 1974,
international organizations can be vital sites for different government officials,
5 I. Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 14, at 49.
52. See Daniel L. Gebert, Sovereignty under the World Heritage Convention: A Questionable Basis
for Limiting the Federal Land Designation Pursuant to International Agreements, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ.
427,429-30 (1998) (citing John M. Goshko, U.N. Becomes Lightning Rod for Rightist Fears, WASH. POST,
Sept. 23, 1996, at A1); David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blaclonan, Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers?: The Waco
Disaster and the Militarization of American Law Enforcement, 30 AKRON L REv. 619,654 (1997).
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including heads of state, to form policy coalitions with their foreign
counterparts to strengthen their hand in domestic bureaucratic struggles." The
impact of the international organization is to "transform potential or tacit
coalitions into explicit ones," as well as to form alliances between an
organization's secretariat and relevant national officials.54 The very existence
of the international organization symbolized member governments'
recognition of the need for cooperation and joint decisionmaking in a
particular area and hence helped to legitimize transgovernmental activity."
By 2000, public doubts and suspicion about the activities of at least certain
international organizations had increased sharply, often due precisely to the
perception that elite transgovernmental interactions were taking place within
them. The "club model" had broken down.' In response, organizations
ranging from the World Trade Organization to the UN to the OECD have
instituted a raft of "outreach efforts" to global civil society, enhancing
transparency, hosting NGO meetings, and acknowledging and promoting
"global policy networks."" Thus far, these efforts have not been enough-the
organizations themselves may simply prove too tempting a target for their
detractors. But in these cases, the transgovernmental activity within these
organizations and the activity of the organization itself seem indistinguishable;
hence, the issue is more complex than can be addressed here.5
B. Transgovernmental Activity within the Framework of Executive
Agreements
Transgovernmental activity within the framework of executive agreements
is often less visible than transgovemmental networks within established
institutions. Further, the very fact of their creation by executive agreement
rather than by treaty means that they have not been approved by the
legislature, even prospectively. And the legitimacy provided by head of state
53. Transgovernmental Relations, supra note 14, at 50-55.
54. Id. at 52.
55. Id. at 50.
56. See Keohane & Nye, Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation, supra note 35.
57. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, WTO & NGOs: Relations with Nov-Governmental
Organizations/Civil Society, at http://www.wto.org/english/forums._e/ngo._C/intro-e.htm (last visited May
15, 2001); Kofi A. Annan, 'We the Peoples:' The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, at
http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/lreport (last visited May 15, 2001) [hereinafter Millennium Report];
http://www.oecd.org.
58. Roberto M. Unger, The Really New Bretton Woods, in THEFINANCIALSYSTEMUNDERSTRESS II-
25 (Marc Uzan ed., 2000) (arguing against the "supranational technocracy" of the IMF and the World Bank).
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approval may be negated if heads of state are themselves engaging in
"transgovernmental collusion."
John Peterson finds evidence of exactly such collusion in his study of
U.S.-EU efforts to implement a New Transatlantic Agenda in the 1990s."9 He
argues that American and European chiefs of government have colluded with
one another to reward some domestic interest groups over others.' Further,
"a central ambition of the New Transatlantic Agenda... is to manufacture the
same sort of complicity between administrations and societies, as distinct from
intergovernmental elites, through new transgovernmental and transnational
exchanges."' Pollack and Shaffer agree, noting that the entire set of
transatlantic initiatives can be understood as a joint effort between the U.S.
Administration and the EU Commission to "institutionalize their joint
preferences" for more transatlantic and global trade liberalization, as well as
to strengthen key domestic constituencies.62
Such accounts can legitimately raise fear and concern among disfavored
domestic constituencies, in this case consumers, environmentalists, and labor.
When the head of state throws his or her power behind some kinds of
transgovernmental (and transnational) contacts but not others, without
legislative input, it can seriously tilt the domestic political playing field.
Observers could draw a similar conclusion from the practice, noted above, of
accompanying a statement by finance ministers and central bankers with a
parallel statement by heads of government. These interactions by heads of state
and the transgovernmental relations resulting from them are analogous, at least
for the U.S. and the EU Commission, to the domestic innovation of
"presidential administration," whereby the head of state controls the political
agenda by executive decree rather than collaborative legislation.63 The
response to the resulting accountability concerns will likely be legislative,
prodded by the disaffection of outmaneuvered domestic constituencies.
59. See generally John Peterson, Get Away From Me Closer, You're Near Me Too Far: Europe and
America after the Uruguay Round, in POLLACK & SHAFFER. supra note 29, at 45-72.
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id.
62. Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. ShatTer, Who Governs?, in POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 29,
at 295.
63. Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 104 HARv. L REv. (forthcoming 2001).
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C. Spontaneous Transgovernmental Networks
Transgovernmental networks that arise outside the framework of
international organizations and executive agreements are most likely to spawn
fears of runaway technocracy. That a regulatory agency would reach out on its
own to its foreign counterparts, even in an effort to solve common problems,
raises the possibility not only of policy collusion, whereby transgovernmental
support can be marshaled against domestic bureaucratic opponents, but also
of the removal of issues from the domestic political sphere through deliberate
technocratic de-politicization."
A wide range of possible measures can combat these perceptions and
enhance public awareness of these networks and even participation in them.65
Creating a well-serviced website for example, can make a network real by
making it virtual." A further step toward enhanced transparency would be to
create the global equivalent of EU "information agencies," entities that "lack
a coercive power of their own," but which instead "provide policy-makers with
the information they need to carry out their policies."'67 Enhanced legislative
oversight of any domestic agency's foreign activities would help; better still
might be the formation of legislative networks--perhaps of representatives of
key legislative committees-to share information and coordinate efforts to
pass parallel domestic legislation." In addition, as is already happening,
transgovernmental networks can be folded into larger "mixed networks" of
governmental and private actors.69 In his Millennium Report, the UN Secretary
General explicitly called for the formation of "global policy networks"
involving a wide range of public and private actors. 0
Another quite different response to accountability concerns regarding
spontaneous networks is the claim that they do not exercise actual power-that
they are mere "talking shops." With few exceptions, such as the Basle
Committee, participants in these networks cannot actually make rules or adopt
64. See Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration, supra note 1, at 1037.
65. 1 have spelled out a number of these measures at some length in a forthcoming essay. See Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? in TRANSATLANrICREGULATORYCO-OPERATION, 521-46 (George
Bermann et al, eds.) (forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose].
66. Anne-Marie Slaughter, rtual Visibility, FOREIGN POL'Y 84-85 (Nov.Dec. 2000).
67. Dehousse, supra note 27, at 254, citing Majone, supra note 26.
68. See Slaughter, Real New World Order, supra note 3, at 197 (describing existing legislative
networks).
69. POLLACK & SHAFFER, supra note 29, at 301 (finding the existence of such networks in the
transatlantic context).
70. Millennium Report, supra note 57.
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policies. They can only disseminate information and bring back
recommendations and proposals for consideration through the normal domestic
legislative or agency rulemaking process.
This view of transgovemmental networks is shortsighted. It misses a key
dimension of the exercise of power in the Information Age. The "talking
shops" generate compilations of best practices, codes of conduct, and
templates for everything from a memorandum of understanding to an
environmental assessment review. As a senior official from the World Bank
recently noted, the dissemination of information has played a far greater role
in triggering policy convergence in various issue areas than more deliberate
and coercive attempts.7
This result is not surprising. In a world awash with information, credible
and authoritative information is at a premium.72 Even more valuable is a
distillation and evaluation of information from many different sources.
Recommended rules and practices compiled by a global body of securities
regulators or environmental officials offer a focal point for convergence.
Equally important, they offer a safe harbor for officials who are looking for
guidance and besieged by consultants.
Yet should government officials be held accountable for either
disseminating or using information? As new forms of global governance
emerge wielding informational power, and probably engaging in new forms
of informational politics, the very concept of accountability-even accepting
its current complexity-must grow and change. These are questions not only
for lawyers and public policymakers, but also for political theorists.
IV. EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Thinking about accountability in terms of new forms of power highlights
the distinction between internal and external accountability. To a domestic
public, accountability refers to the relationship between it and its government
officials. Yet in analyzing the impact of the information compiled and
disseminated by transgovernmental networks, the flow of such information is
71. Andres Rigo, Law Harmonization Resulting From the Policies of International Financial
Institutions: The Case of the World Bank, speech delivered at A Conference on Globalization and the
Evolution of Legal Systems, University of Ottawa, (Oct., 2000). See generally, CoMMITMENT AND
COMpuANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NoRMs IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton
ed., 2000).
72. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence in the Information Age, 77
FOREIGN AFF. 81 (Sept./Oct. 1998).
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far more likely to proceed from developed country government officials to
developing country government officials. This asymmetry raises the issue of
accountability in the global community, or the "external" accountability of one
nation to another.
Addressing this question in detail, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article. I have elsewhere advanced a set of principles that could provide a
framework for regulating transgovernmental relations, at least in the context
of transgovernmental conflict.73 First, the context of transgovernmental
relations should be understood differently from intergovernmental relations.
Cooperation is to be valued, but not necessarily cemented. Conflict is positive,
the vehicle for building trust and shared understandings over time.7' In a word,
conflict must be treated like conflict in a liberal domestic political system,
rather than conflict in the world of diplomacy. It is a natural and normal part
of politics, 5 not a danger to be dampened.
Second, within this altered context, government officials engaged in
interactions with their foreign counterparts should be guided by the principles
of legitimate difference and positive comity. Legitimate difference reflects the
established principle in conflicts of law that difference, in and of itself, should
be respected as long as it falls within a broad zone circumscribed by
fundamental principles of the common weal.76 As a working principle, it
requires presumptive recognition of foreign rules rather than the automatic
acceptance mandated by mutual recognition. Positive comity is a companion
principle. Developed in the context of U.S.-EU antitrust relations, it requires
officials not simply to recognize foreign rules and practices, but also to give
foreign officials the first opportunity to take action on problems that fall within
their jurisdiction.77
73. Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose, supra note 65, at 521-46.
74. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN. A PROPENSnTY TO SELF-SUBVERSION 235 (1995) ("Social conflicts
themselves produce the valuable ties that hold modem democratic societies together and lend them the
strength and cohesion they need.").
75. Id.
76. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918).
The courts are not free to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit
the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors unless
help would violate some fundamental principle ofjustice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.
Id. at 201.
77. Agreement Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, E.C.-U.S., 30
I. L M. 1491. Article V of the Agreement provides that if Party A believes that its "important interests" are
being adversely affected by anticompetitive activities that violate Party A's competition laws but occur
within the territory of Party B, Party A may request that Party B initiate enforcement activities. Id. at 1056-
59. Thus, Government B, in deference to Government A, is expected to consider enforcement steps that it
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These principles would apply only to some kinds of transgovernmental
relations, notably those in which action by one government agency could harm
its foreign counterpart through nonrecognition of the foreign rule or
extraterritorial action. They might also be adapted to guide the formation and
evolution of transgovernmental networks in the sense that compilers of codes
of best practices might be required to cast a broader net. Their principal
importance at this stage of their analysis is to put the larger issue of global
accountability on the table.
CONCLUSION
Transgovernmental networks are an increasingly important form of global
governance. They are not new, but they are particularly notable as a
governance strategy in an era of globalization. They arise in a number of
different contexts-within international organizations, within the framework
of an executive agreement, and spontaneously in response to common
problems.
Each of these three categories raises distinct, if overlapping, accountability
problems. Transgovernmental networks within international organizations
used to be largely invisible and relatively unproblematic; they now face the
challenge of relegitimizing the entire organization in the face of rising
domestic opposition. Transgovernmental networks within the framework of an
executive agreement raise the specific problem of executive collusion to
circumvent national legislatures. And spontaneous government networks
evoke images of national regulators reaching out across borders to make the
world safe for bureaucracy.
It is relatively easy to generate specific measures to enhance transparency
and public access in each category. Administrative lawyers who specialize in
resolving such questions at the domestic level can now turn their attention to
transgovernmental regulatory activity. The deeper issue, however, is the way
in which regulatory networks most frequently exercise power--through the
distillation and dissemination of authoritative and credible information to their
members throughout the world. When does borrowing and implementing
models and ideas from abroad contravene a domestic political mandate? And
might not otherwise have taken. For a more detailed account of the development of this principle, see
Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose. supra note 65, at 538-42.
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when does the impact of global information flows primarily from developed
to developing countries raise issues of global accountability? These are the
theoretical challenges posed by transgovernmental governance.

